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Abstract  
Purpose – Data security breaches are an increasingly common and costly problem for 
organizations, yet there are critical gaps in our understanding of the role of stakeholder 
relationship management and crisis communication in relation to data breaches. In fact, 
though there have been some studies focusing on data breaches, little is known about what 
might constitute a “typical” response to data breaches whether those responses are effective 
at maintaining the stakeholders’ relationship with the organization, their commitment 
to use the organization after the crisis, or the reputational threat of the crisis. Further, even 
less is known about the factors most influencing response and outcome evaluation during 
data breaches. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We identify a “typical” response strategy to data breaches 
and then evaluate the role of this response in comparison to situation, stakeholder 
demographics and relationships between stakeholders, the issue and the organization using an 
experimental design. This experiment focuses on a 2 (type of organization) 3 2 (prior 
knowledge of breach risk) with a control group design.  
 
Findings – Findings suggest that rather than employing reactive crisis response messaging the 
role of public relations should focus on proactive relationship building between organizations 
and key stakeholders.  
 
Originality/value – For the last several decades much of the field of crisis communication has 
assumed that in the context of a crisis the response strategy itself would materially help the 
organization. These data suggest that the field crisis communication may have been making 
the wrong assumption. In fact, these data suggest that reactive crisis response has little-to-no 
effect once we consider the relationships between organizations, the issue and stakeholders. 
The findings show that an ongoing program of crisis capacity building is to an organization’s 
strategic advantage when data security breaches occur. 
 
Keywords UK, Strategic communication, Crisis response, Data breach, Crisis capacity, 
Stakeholder relationship model 
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Both industry and academic publications define data breaches as incidents where private or 
confidential information – especially medical and/or financial records – are put at risk of 
exposure (2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report, 2019; Kim, Johnson, & Park, 2017). In IBM’s 
Cost of a Data Breach Report (2019), three primary causes are identified – criminal attacks, 
system glitches (i.e., technical errors), and human error. The report found the average cost of 
lost business for organizations in 2019 was $1.42 million (USD) and affected customer 
turnover by 3.9 percent. In fact, two-thirds of people report being less likely to do business 
with an organization that has experienced a breach where financial and/or sensitive 
information was stolen (Graham, 2019).  
 
Unfortunately, the problem of data breaches is also increasing each year (Gwebu, Wang, & 
Wang, 2018). Figure 1 summarizes the annual data on global security breaches, that have 
been reported by the media and suggest that while system glitches vary year-by-year, the 
growth and reporting of criminal attacks on organizations has grown by 270 percent in just 
two years leading to an annual global loss of more than 2.8 billion data records in 2019 
(Graham, 2018, 2019; Irwin, 2020). In practical terms, it is much more likely that both 
organizations and their stakeholders have already been directly affected by a data breach and 
the nearly exponential growth trends represents a critical risk. The 2020 COVID-19 global 
pandemic further highlighted data protection vulnerabilities as organizations globally 
scrambled to manage the transition from traditional work routines to virtual work 
environments. For example, a reported 71 percent of British business decision-makers 
believing the shift to remote working has increased their risk of data breach (Sullivan, 2020).  
 
   
Figure 1. Summary of the global data breaches from 2017-2019 based on IT Governance’s Annual Reports 
 
Data breaches are not merely a technical problem for organizations to solve. IBM (2019) 
points out that the cost of the breach will vary based on the cause as well as the risk 
mitigation processes put in place ahead of the breach. The report found that much of the cost 
of the data breach was in the reputational and trust damage done to organizations affected by 
the breaches. The IBM report also found that organizations with effective incident response 
teams and extensive testing of their response teams saved millions. Likewise, academic 
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as much a function of reputation management and good communication with stakeholders as 
it is technically managing the breach (Angst, Block, D'arcy, & Kelley, 2017; Choi, Kim, & 
Jiang, 2016; Gwebu et al., 2018; Syed, 2019; Wang & Park, 2017).  
 
There is, however, a dearth of research directly exploring data breaches despite their growing 
impact and direct communicative implications. Existing research identifies the limitations 
and need for empirical studies of the role of strategic communication before, during, and after 
data breaches (Choi et al., 2016; Rosati, Deeney, Cummins, Van der Werff, & Lynn, 2019; 
Wang & Park, 2017). Even where crisis research has explored data breaches, it often focuses 
on the connections between reputation in a social media context, such as how users might 
tweet about cyber-attacks (Confente, Siciliano, Gaudenzi, & Eickhoff, 2019; Vogler & 
Meissner, 2020) or with analyses of organizational responses and other indirect measures of 
stakeholder attitudes instead of direct measures (Bentley, Oostman, & Shah, 2018; Gwebu et 
al., 2018; Kim et al., 2017; Kim & Lee, 2018; Wang & Park, 2017). Yet findings from the 
few studies directly connecting data breaches and stakeholder attitudes suggest that investing 
in stakeholder relationship development holds critical value for organizations who may 
experience these types of crises (Jahng & Hong, 2017; Janakiraman, Lim, & Rishika, 2018).  
 
Moreover, there are indications that many of crisis communication’s assumptions about the 
effectiveness of the ‘right’ kind of crisis response may not be realized in the data. For 
example, counter to previous findings, Bakker, van Bommel, Kerstolt, and Giebels (2018) 
found that specific crisis response messages had little to no direct effect on outcome 
measures. There are also divergent findings in the literature about specific strategies applied 
across situations (Diers‐Lawson & Pang, 2016; Fuoli, van de Weijer, & Paradis, 2017), so it 
is difficult to generate reliable and actionable communication recommendations for post 
crisis response. At the same time, there are clear findings that pre-crisis relationships between 
organizations, stakeholders, and issues have been found to meaningfully affect stakeholder 
attitudes about organizations in crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2015; 2006; Johnston & Lane, 
2018; Ma, 2018; Tao & Song, 2020; Yum & Jeong, 2014) and coupled with research 
demonstrating the impact stakeholder emotion invoked by the crisis itself (Cho & Gower, 
2006; Diers-Lawson, 2017b; Jin, 2014; McDonald, Sparks, & Glendon, 2010; Schoofs, 
Claeys, De Waele, & Cauberghe, 2019), the question we should be broadly asking is what is 
the role of communication during security breaches?  
 
We argue the focus should be directly on building an organization’s capacity, which includes 
responding, managing, and serving stakeholder interests ahead of crisis (Heath, Lee, & Ni, 
2009; Tao & Song, 2020). This approach highlights research findings that pre-crisis 
instructional messaging demonstrates strong impacts on people’s behaviors and attitudes 
(Johnston & Lane, 2018; Sellnow, Johansson, Sellnow, & Lane, 2019; Zhou & Ki, 2018). As 
such, it becomes clear that the challenge of data breaches is as much a question of risk 
management or mitigation as it is post-crisis response. This view of data breaches is also 
aligned with Health and Millar’s (2004) conceptualization of crises as untimely but 
predictable events. Therefore, the central aim of this paper is to explore the role of 
stakeholder attitudes and crisis communication in the context of data breaches to close the 
gaps in our knowledge.  
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Stakeholder Attitudes and Crisis Capacity 
 
Strategic communication can be used to build capacity for managing crises; therefore, the 
stakeholder is and should always be the critical focus for any issues and crisis response 
(Diers-Lawson, 2020). Moreover, in the context of the data breach where it is the 
stakeholder’s private information that has been compromised, the stakeholder’s interests and 
concerns must be prioritized in order to manage the situation (e.g., Angst, et al., 2017; Choi, 
et al., 2016; IBM, 2019). Though stakeholder relationships differ from interpersonal ones 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2015), they can be characterized by pre-crisis relationship quality 
(Atkins & Lowe, 1994), the history of interaction with the organization (Jennings, Artz, 
Gillin, & Christodouloy, 2000), legitimate stakeholder interests in the data breach (Angst, et 
al., 2017), power the stakeholders have to affect the organization’s success (IBM, 2019), and 
clear urgency to both address the material problems of the breach as well as stakeholder 
concerns (Janakiraman et al., 2018).  
 
Stakeholder Relationship Management 
 
As we discussed in the introduction, there is already unmistakable evidence of exponential 
growth in data breach cases globally (see Figure 1) and even greater risk because of the social 
distancing measures and move to more online work as a result of the COVID-19. Our core 
assumption is that stakeholder relationship management is vital to the successful resolution of 
data breaches. Thus, by adopting Diers-Lawson’s (2020) stakeholder relationship model 
(SRM) as the core analytical model, we focus on the relationships between stakeholders, 
organizations, and the security of private data suggesting and posit that an organization’s 
crisis capacity is likely as important as its direct response to a breach. 
 
The Relationship Between the Issues and Organizations – Blame, Competence  
 
Stakeholders make judgments about how organizations are connected to issues 
concerning them. Two of the most commonly cited judgements about the issue - organization 
relationship are judgments of the organization’s competence to successfully manage the issue 
(Hyvärinen & Vos, 2015; Sohn & Lariscy, 2014), and of course whether they believe the 
organization should be blamed for the emergent crisis (Coombs, 2007; Schwarz, 2008).    
 
Blame. Blame attribution is a core concept underlying different theories like 
situational crisis communication theory and it is applied in other crisis communication 
research connecting to other factors like corporate social responsibility, crisis history, and 
ethics (Kim, 2013; Ping, Ishaq, & Li, 2015). However, much of crisis communication theory 
conflates material blame and blame attribution. Material blame for a crisis is the degree to 
which organizations can be directly held accountable for a crisis (Rosati et al., 2019). This is 
why transgressions, or situations where direct blame is clearly attributable to the organization 
(Diers-Lawson, 2017a), tend to result in the greatest perceptions that the organization has 
betrayed the stakeholder’s trust (Kim, Kim, & Cameron, 2009; Ma, 2018). Blame attribution, 
by comparison, represents the stakeholder’s perception of the control the organization has 
over the issue (Weiner, 1985, 2006). Regardless of whether blame is perceptual or material,  
the more the crisis can be blamed on the organization, the higher the expectations placed on 
organizations to effectively manage the issue or crisis (Brown & Ki, 2013; Bundy & Pfarrer, 
2015; Coombs, 2007). Previous research also suggests that higher perceptions of blame 
results in greater reputational damage for organizations (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; S. Kim, 
2014; Schwarz, 2012) as well as negatively affecting behavioral intention towards 
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organizations in crisis (Ping et al., 2015; Yum & Jeong, 2014). However, Bentley, Oosman, 
and Shah (2018) point out that present theory building around crisis type struggles to account 
for contexts in which blame for the situation is more ambiguous, which is often the case with 
data breach crises. The result in these blame ambiguous crises, or organizational events 
(Diers-Lawson, 2017a), is that it is more difficult to provide tangible recommendations about 
crisis response strategy. This leads us to the conclusion that more clearly defining the context 
or situation, based on the information that would typically be a part of public discourse about 
a crisis will help us to better predict stakeholder reactions to organizational events like data 
breaches (Wang & Park, 2017); rather than merely assuming researcher and practitioner-
based assumptions of blame attribution reflectingn on stakeholder evaluations. This is one of 
the reasons the present research looks beyond attribution-based theories in order to fully 
understand different situational factors that would affect the stakeholder, issue, and 
organizational dynamic. However, based on the strength of the previous research, we would 
predict that the level of blame will affect stakeholder evaluations and leaders to the following 
three hypotheses:  
 
H1: Material blame will affect stakeholder evaluations of crisis response messages.   
H2: Material blame will affect stakeholder behavioral intentions towards 
organizations.  
 H3: Material blame will affect the reputational threat generated by data breaches      
 
Competence. Questions about how stakeholders assign blame to organizations have 
been asked since the 1970’s with Schwartz and Ben David’s (1976) analysis of blame, ability, 
and denial of responsibility in the face of emergencies. However, evaluations of an 
organization’s competence in crisis response is, by contrast, a newer evolution in the field’s 
understanding of the relationship between organizations and issues (Diers, 2012; Sohn & 
Lariscy, 2014). While competence has long been considered from an organization 
perspective, it has not always been considered from the stakeholder perspective. Competence 
asks whether stakeholders judge the organization has the capacity to successful resolve the 
problem (de Fatima Oliveira, 2013; Hyvärinen & Vos, 2015).  
 
While there is evidence that competence in responding to and managing data breaches results 
in significantly lower costs for organizations facing them (IBM, 2019), there is also clear 
evidence that two-thirds of people report being less likely to shop or do business with an 
organization that has experienced a breach where financial or sensitive information was 
stolen (Graham, 2019). Though practitioner data points to clear outcomes, we lack clear 
theoretical connections to reconcile these two findings and predict how stakeholder 
evaluations of competence may influence outcomes to data breaches or how organizations 
can influence competence evaluations, reducing the value of making predictions about its 
impact. Therefore, we posit the following research question: 
 
RQ1: Do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s competence to manage data 
breaches influence their attitudes about the organizations after a breach occurs? 
RQ1A: Do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s competence to 
manage data breaches influence their evaluations of crisis response 
messages? 
RQ1B: Do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s competence to 
manage data breaches influence their behavioral intention towards the 
organizations? 
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RQ1C: Do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s competence to 
manage data breaches influence the reputational threat generated by data 
breaches for organizations? 
 
Stakeholders and Their Relationship to the Issue of Data Breaches 
 
Stakeholder judgments about blame and competence are not made in a vacuum, they also 
come from stakeholder experiences and identities (Diers-Lawson, 2020). In the context of 
data security, previous research has found that individual attributes and attitudes shape 
privacy attitudes and data security behavioral intentions (Egelman & Peer, 2015). This view 
is well-aligned with research on attitude formation emphasizing the importance of constructs 
like perceived susceptibility, situation severity, demographics, and efficacy as key predictors 
of people’s reactions to stimuli and situations (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001; Rosenstock, 
Strecher, & Becker, 1988). It is also well-aligned with research predicting that our behaviors 
can be accounted for by our existing attitudes, social norms, and perceived situational control 
(Ajzen, 2005). In fact, these findings also reflect research in crisis communication suggesting 
that stakeholder perceptions of their own control over issues and uncertainty about the 
situation affect not only their own emotional reactions to crises but attitudes and actions 
towards the organizations in crisis (Jin, Liu, Anagondahalli, & Austin, 2014; McDonald & 
Cokley, 2013; Mou & Lin, 2014).  
 
Despite clear connections between the stakeholders, crises, and data breaches, there is little 
indication as to the role that stakeholders’ attitudes and previous experiences with data 
security breaches would inform their reactions to crisis responses or their behavioral 
intentions towards organizations in crisis. One reason for this is that there are few direct 
measures of stakeholder attitudes on crisis response outside of the context of social media 
analyses. For example, studies like Kim, Johnson, and Park’s (2017) analysis of five data 
breaches only looks at types of organizational responses, not stakeholder reactions to them. 
These descriptive studies are common in crisis communication research and have emerged in 
the first stage of research of data breaches (Bentley et al., 2018; Kim & Lee, 2018; Syed, 
2019; Wang & Park, 2017); yet, it is important we continue to develop more sophisticated 
understandings of stakeholder factors. Therefore, we posit the following research question:  
 
RQ2: How do stakeholders’ attitudes towards data security breaches influence their 
attitudes about the organizations after a breach occurs? 
RQ2A: How do stakeholders’ attitudes towards data security breaches 
influence their evaluations of crisis response messages? 
RQ2B: How do stakeholders’ attitudes towards data security breaches 
influence their behavioral intention towards the organizations? 
RQ2C: How do stakeholders’ attitudes towards data security breaches 
influence the reputational threat generated by data breaches for 
organizations? 
 
The Relationship Between Stakeholders and Organizations in Crisis 
 
In the stakeholder relationship management model, the third major relationship to consider is 
the relationship between stakeholders and organizations in crisis (Diers-Lawson, 2020). One 
way theory in crisis communication has been developed is to examine the material impact of 
data breaches on consumer spending (e.g., Janakiraman, et al., 2018); however, the field 
needs to better understand the causal stakeholder attitudes underlying the behaviors to 
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improve predictive theory building. For example, research like Jahng and Hong’s (2017) 
analysis applying social information processing theory to crisis response in data breaches 
found that prior brand attitude was a significant moderator in predicting purchase intentions. 
Across the existing industry and academic research on data breaches a consistent conclusion 
is that relationship management is a critical investment for any organization (2019 Cost of a 
Data Breach Report, 2019; Choi et al., 2016; Confente et al., 2019; Gwebu et al., 2018; 
Janakiraman et al., 2018; Syed, 2019).  
 
Stakeholders’ attitudes towards organizations in crisis have been studied extensively in crisis 
communication (Diers, 2012). However, these relationships focusing on reputation and 
trustworthiness are often treated as outcome variables instead of attributes of organizations. 
We would separate the concept of reputational damage or threat, which is a multi-step 
process that combines stakeholder evaluations of crisis severity and blame attribution with 
intensifiers like the organization’s crisis history and its pre-crisis reputation (Diers-Lawson, 
2020; Maresh & Williams, 2007; van Zoonen & van der Meer, 2015) as a distinctive concept 
from reputation and trustworthiness. Broadly, reputation represents stakeholder perceptions 
of an organization’s appeal (Brown, Brown, & Billings, 2015), its social responsibility as a 
reflection of the organization’s ethics (Bowen & Zheng, 2015), and its values (Falkheimer & 
Heide, 2015). And trustworthiness focuses on stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s 
positive intent, behavior, and integrity (Mal, Davies, & Diers‐Lawson, 2018; Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman, 1995; Shockley-Zalabak, Morreale, & Hackman, 2010). Because of the 
conflation of reputational threat and trustworthiness as outcomes versus pre-crisis reputation 
and trustworthiness as measurable factors contributing to how stakeholders make sense of 
crises, we would post the following research questions: 
 
RQ3: How do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s reputation influence their 
attitudes about the organizations after a breach occurs? 
RQ3B: How do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s reputation 
influence their evaluations of crisis response messages? 
RQ3B: How do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s reputation 
influence their behavioral intention towards the organizations? 
RQ3C: How do stakeholder evaluations of an organization’s reputation 
influence the reputational threat generated by data breaches for 
organizations? 
 
RQ4: How does an organization’s trustworthiness influence stakeholder attitudes 
about the organizations after a breach occurs? 
RQ4B: How does an organization’s trustworthiness influence stakeholder 
evaluations of crisis response messages? 
RQ4B: How does an organization’s trustworthiness influence stakeholder 
behavioral intention towards the organizations? 
RQ4C: How does an organization’s trustworthiness influence stakeholder the 
reputational threat generated by data breaches for organizations? 
 
Crisis Capacity, Data Breaches, and Communication 
 
Since most research connecting stakeholders and data breaches is either descriptive or 
examines outcomes like final sales instead of stakeholder attitudes, there are insufficient 
studies to make more than weak hypotheses predicting a generic impact for each of the 
variables. What would be more useful in developing both theory and recommendations for 
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corporate communication practice is to place these relationships within the context of crisis 
capacity building (Diers-Lawson, 2020). Crisis capacity embraces Heath and Millar’s (2004) 
notion that organizations should be the stewards of stakeholder interests and builds on Stacks 
(2004) multidimensional model of public relations. Stacks argues that effective crisis 
management focuses on three dimensions. First, an institutionalization of the corporate 
communications functions within organizations to build strong relationships with 
stakeholders helping to mitigate issues as they emerge, which improves decision-making, 
crisis response, and corporate strategy (Campiranon & Scott, 2014; Frandsen & Johansen, 
2009; Miller & Horsley, 2009; Takamatsu, 2014). Second, considering the type of 
organization and customizing crisis response to build a consistent narrative that is both 
industry and organization-centered is essential for success (Bowen & Zheng, 2015; Kal-
kausar, Rafida, Nurulhusna, Alina, & Mashitoh, 2013; Stacks, 2004). Third, effective crisis 
response develops specific and targeted messaging (Stacks, 2004; Steelman & McCaffrey, 
2013). In an era where information seeking in crisis contexts is high and information sharing 
happens across platforms, it is certainly vital that organizations’ engagement during data 
breaches is effective (Confente et al., 2019; Jahng & Hong, 2017; Vogler & Meissner, 2020; 
Wang & Park, 2017).  
 
In addition to considering the influence of the relationships between organizations, 
stakeholders and issues as the stakeholder relationship model suggests, to understand the 
differences that can emerge in crisis capacity building between industries (e.g., Bowen & 
Zheng, 2015; Kalkausar, et al., 2013; Stacks, 2004) we also believe that a comparison 
between two of the industries that are most susceptible to data security breaches would 
provide richer information about crisis capacity building for data security. Therefore, we pose 
the following research question: 
 
RQ5: Does the industry affected by the data security breach influence stakeholder 
attitudes about the organizations after a breach occurs? 
RQ5A: Does the industry affected by the data security breach influence 
stakeholder evaluations of crisis response messages? 
RQ5B: Does the industry affected by the data security breach influence 
stakeholder behavioral intentions towards the organizations? 
RQ5C: Does the industry affected by the data security break influence 
reputational threat generated by data breaches for organizations? 
 
To summarize in brief, we propose the following conceptual model drawing together the 
stakeholder relationship management model and the consideration of industry (see Figure 2).  
  




Issue to Organization (IO) 
(H1-3, RQ1)
Stakeholder to Issue (SI) 
(RQ2)
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Based on the study’s design, we also propose the following overall research question: 
 
RQ6: Which factors are most likely to affect organizations after a security data 
breach crisis?  
RQ6A: Which factors best predict the success of a likely organizational 
response to data breaches?  
RQ6B: Which factors best predict changes to stakeholders’ behavioral 
intention after a data breach crisis? 
RQ6C: Which factors best predict stakeholders’ evaluation of reputational 
threat after a data breach crisis? 
RQ6D: Controlling for factors influencing outcomes, how much influence does 





To close the gaps in our knowledge, this study first establishes what a ‘typical’ organizational 
response to data breach is and then uses a 2 (material blame - organization at fault, 
organization not at fault) x 2 (type of organization – bank or primary health care provider) 
design with an additional control group (material blame - no crisis) in order to measure the 
impact of crisis capacity building as well as crisis response messages on public stakeholder 
behavioral intention.  
 
Operationalizing the Type of Data Breach and Organizations 
 
Previous research suggests there are three common types of data breach - criminal attacks, 
system glitches (i.e., technical errors), and human error. Instead of focusing on all three, we 
have focused on criminal attacks as being both the types of data breaches receiving the 
majority of media coverage with widespread reports over ransomware affecting global health, 
financial, and retail organizations and also because they are likely to generate the greatest 
issue engagement with stakeholders. In the coverage of criminal attacks, two types of 
material blame for organizations emerged – where organizations were warned about these 
cyberattacks and yet did not make changes in their systems ("NHS 'could have prevented' 
WannaCry ransomware attack," 2017) versus those organizations that can take measures to 
minimize or mitigate their risk to cyberattacks (O'Flaherty, 2018). To minimize the length of 
the questionnaire, we also used a control group design for the questionnaire instead of a 
pretest-posttest design.  
 
Rather than focusing on a generic global response to data security breaches, because the 
experiment targeted British participants, cases of publicly reported data breaches in the UK, 
compiled by the company IT Governance UK, reported from January 2019-October 2019 
were reviewed to identify the types of crisis response messages used by companies (N = 27) 
in order to identify the most culturally relevant responses since previous research has already 
identified there are likely to be cultural differences in crisis response (Kim & Lee, 2018). Of 
these 27 breaches, nine were attributable to user error or inappropriate data use within 
organizations, seven to technology failures, and 11 to criminal attack.  
 
Organizational responses to these crises were coded based on Diers-Lawson’s (2017a) 
typology of crisis response strategy to identify a typical ‘British’ response to data breaches 
which left personal information vulnerable to exploitation. Two independent coders analyzed 
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the responses with an 86% agreement on response coding. The analysis revealed that the 
most typical responses included accommodative (N = 8), framing the situation (N = 16), 
framing the organization (N = 6), excellence (N = 9), and interorganizational collaboration (N 
= 6) message strategies. One of the responses was selected and anonymized to represent a 
‘typical’ response to data security breaches (see Appendix A). 
 
Additionally, because data breaches focus on personal and private information being leaked 
like medical records and financial information and because both health organizations and 
financial organizations are consistent targets for cyberattacks (Graham, 2018, 2019; Irwin, 
2020), we selected banks and primary health care providers as the types of organizations that 
would be used in the experiment. Brief scenarios were written (see Appendix B) to account 




The experiment’s manipulation check was confirmed to be successful in two ways. The first 
was simply to identify whether participants understood the manipulation scenario. A Chi-
square was used to identify the significance of the situation comprehension responses. In 
condition 1 – Bank, Material Blame 57 of 62 participants correctly recognized the summary 
of the situation (2 (3) = 148.19, p < .00). In condition 2 – GP (i.e., the British term for 
primary care physician or doctor’s office), Material Blame 54 of 58 participants correctly 
recognized the summary of the situation (2 (2) = 98.55, p < .00). In condition 3 – Bank, No 
Material Blame, 60 of 66 participants correctly recognized the summary of the situation (2 
(4) = 193.72, p < .00). In condition 4 – GP, No Material Blame 59 of 71 participants correctly 
recognized the summary of the situation (2 (3) = 127.93, p < .00). In condition 5 – Control 
67 of 71 participants correctly recognized the summary of the situation (2 (3) = 182.24, p < 
.00). 
 
The second way the manipulation check was confirmed was with a question after participants 
left the situation summary page to ensure they correctly remembered the situation by asking 
them, ‘You have just read a statement about institutions that hold your private and secure 
information. To summarize the key theme, would you say this passage was primarily 
about…’ and they selected the best response. A one-way ANOVA was run with the test 
condition as the independent variable and Scheffe post hocs confirming significant 




Participants were recruited through a snowball convenience approach resulting in 328 
participants, 77% of whom lived in the UK (N = 252) and 23% (N = 76) either reported 
living outside of the UK or did not respond to that question. The sample was female biased 
with 61% (N = 200) self-identifying as female, 22.3% (N = 73) self-identifying as male, and 
16.8% (N = 55) not responding or responding ‘other’.  
 
There was a reasonable distribution of participants based on age but with a slight bias with 
1.5% (N = 4) representing people born from 1924-1945, 16.5% (N = 45) representing those 
born 1946-1964, 35.5% (N = 97) representing those born 1965-1979, 9.2% (N = 25) 
representing those born 1980-1994, and 37.4% (N = 102) representing those born 1995 and 
after, with 55 not responding to the question. Though not a representative sample, systematic 
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differences in the sample were balanced using a random assignment of participants to 
experimental groups.  
 
The sample had a bias towards more affluent participants compared to the overall UK 
population (see Table 1 for the distribution). However, the sample is relatively representative 
of education levels in the UK with an overrepresentation of people with a bachelor’s degree 
or post-graduate degrees (N = 128 or 47%) compared to the UK general population (40% 
BA, plus). However, participants with vocational degrees (N = 51 or 19%) and who have 
completed secondary education or college (N = 93 or 34%) are relatively similar to the UK 
general population.  
 










Less than £10,000 27 9.9 1767 3 
£10,000-19,999 11 4.0 11593 18 
£20,000-29,999 29 10.6 17312 27 
£30,000-39,999 27 9.9 14162 22 
£40,000-49,999 26 9.5 8161 13 
£50,000-59,999 20 7.3 5448 8 
£60,000-69,999 23 8.4 2617 4 
£70,000-79,999 12 4.4 1369 2 
£80,000-89,999 21 7.7 857 1 
£90,000-99,999 25 9.2 460 1 
Over £100,000 52 19.1 1427 2 
Notes: 1UK Frequency noted in thousands, from UK Office of National Statistics Data for 2019 available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulle
tins/householddisposableincomeandinequality/financialyearending2019#:~:text=Median%20household%20dis
posable%20income%20in,Living%20Costs%20and%20Food%20Survey.   
 
Operationalization of Variables 
 
The design controls for demographic factors (gender, age, income, education) and then 
analyses the relationship between the issue to organization (material blame and competence), 
stakeholder to issue (uncertainty avoidance, efficacy, data security behaviors, issue 
experience), stakeholder to organization (trustworthiness, reputation), and industry (medical 
or financial services) all evaluated as independent variables or control variables and crisis 
response statement effectiveness and behavioral intention (using the organization in the 
future and organizational support) used as key study variables.  
 
Scales were evaluated using an exploratory principle components factor analysis (EFA)with a 
varimax rotation. Because most of the variables are being tested in new contexts and different 
populations, an EFA is more appropriate than a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) because 
there is no hypothesized factor structure (Suhr, 2006). Once the factors were identified, 
Cronbach’s alpha was used to test the reliability of the measures. Table 1 provides the 
operationalization, results of the factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha, relevant authors, and 
overall means for the variables.  
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Table II Operationalization of Study Variables, Descriptive Statistics 
 







SI: Uncertainty Avoidance1 Jung & Kellaris, 
2004 
3.03 3.10 38.79  .82 
SI: Efficacy  Chen, Gully, Eden, 
2001 
3.90 4.45 55.65  .88 
SI: Security Behavior2: Software Updates Egelman & Peer, 
2015 
2.93 4.15 34.60  .79 
SI: Security Behavior2: Password Updates Egelman & Peer, 
2015 
2.94 1.42 11.86  .74 
Behavioral Intention: Use the organization Ajzen, 1991 2.89 2.49 41.46  .76 
Organizational Support Ajzen, 1991 3.43 1.26 20.93  .66 
Reputation Threat 
Based on this situation, how much damage 



















SO: Trustworthiness Morgan & Hunt, 
1994 
3.21 3.12 78.04  .91 
SO: Reputation Diers-Lawson, 
2020; Diers, 2012; 
Walsh, Gianfranco, 
& Beatty, 2007 
3.20 3.86 64.25  .89 
IO: Data-Security Competence 
  
Hargis & Watt, 
2010; Jaques, 2009 
3.11 1.97 65.55  
 
.73 
Crisis Response Statement Effectiveness 
The response is believable 
The organisation clearly regrets what 
happened 
The organisation will take all actions 
necessary  
The statement was accommodating 
The statement was socially responsible 
The statement provided good information 
about the situation 
The response was appropriate to the 
situation 
The statement reflects well on the 
organisation 














SI: Issue Experience – Others 
Do you know anyone who has been affected 
by a data breach? 
Do you know anyone who has had a social 
media or email account  hacked? 





SI: Issue Experience – Personal 
Have you ever personally been affected by a 
data breach?  
Have you ever had a social media or email 
account hacked? 





1Resulted in 3-factor rotation, only 1 viable factor based on Cronbach’s alpha  
2Resulted in a 3-factor rotation, 2 viable factors based on Cronbach’s alpha 
3Resulted in a 4-factor rotation, 2 viable factors based on Cronbach’s alpha 
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Data Analysis Methods 
 
A combination of correlation with hierarchical regression and ANOVA with Scheffe post hoc 





Overall, these data suggest that while organizations may use multi-layered messages to 
respond to data breaches, pre-crisis relationships with organizations are the principal factors 
that influence stakeholder attitudes about message, behavioral intent, and reputational threat. 
These results provide clear support for building a crisis capacity strategy for stakeholder 
relationship management to safeguard against negative outcomes for data breaches. This 
section will focus on the results for each of the relationships analyzed in turn.  
 
Evaluating the Relationship Between the Issue and Organization After Data Breaches 
 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and Research Question 1 evaluate the relationship between the issue 
(i.e., data breach) and the organization by evaluating the influence of material blame and 
competence in banks (B) compared the doctor’s office (GP) on stakeholders’ evaluation of 
message strategy and behavioral intention. ANOVAs were run to evaluate hypotheses 1 and 
2. Correlations and simple regressions were run to answer RQ1.  
 
H1-3 – The Effects of Material Blame on Message Evaluation and Outcomes 
 
H1 proposing the material blame will affect message evaluation was supported. The ANOVA 
is significant (F (4, 273) = 3.79; p  = .01) and the Scheffe post hoc (see Table II) reveals a 
significant difference between the control (M = 3.63) and GP with no material blame (M = 
3.96), these data also reveal that across all conditions – including the control condition – that 
communicating an information-rich message highlighting competence, caring, cooperation, 
and the organization’s identity is positively rated amongst stakeholders (M = 3.77). This 
suggests that as an approach to communicating about data security issues, practitioners using 
these types of talking points are judged as communicating effectively with stakeholders.  
 
Table III ANOVA for the Impact of Material Blame on Message Evaluation and Outcomes 
 
Dependent Variable df F p Post Hoc I Post Hoc J I-J Sig.  
Statement Effectiveness 4, 273 3.79 .01 GP, NM C .33 .03 
Behavioral Intention – Use 
the Organization 











Notes: The alpha for all tests was set at .05. Only significant differences in Post hocs reported 
1 B = Bank, 2 GP = Clinic, 3 C = Control Group, 4 NM = No Material Blame, 5 M = Material Blame 
 
The ANOVA results support hypothesis 2 (F (4, 323) = 6.14; p = .00) that suggests material 
blame has influences on stakeholder behavior intentions. The results reveal there were 
differences in behavioral intention between industries (see Table III). In terms of behavioral 
intention to use the organization’s services in the future, material blame mattered. The post 
hoc results demonstrate customers of banks who were aware of the threat and failed to act to 
prevent it are more likely to switch banks (M = 2.53). However, it was also found that the GP 
in the same situation (M = 2.87) was in a homogeneous subset with the banks at fault. That 
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does not mean that there is no risk even when organizations are not at fault or do not face a 
crisis. In fact, these data suggest that banks experiencing a data breach where they had the 
latest technology and were vigilant about security issues also have risk of losing customers 
(M = 2.93). Similarly, organizations not even in crisis but who discuss data security also face 
a mild threat of losing customers (M = 2.96). The only context where respondents indicated 
that there was no significant threat to losing ‘customers’ were GPs that could demonstrate 
proactive efforts to protect their patients’ data (M = 3.09). Together, these data suggest that 
organizations discussing data breaches will be negatively affected regardless of whether a 
breach has happened directly to that organization. However, the magnitude and potential 
impact of that threat will depend on industry and material blame.  
 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported; material blame had no significant influence on reputational 
threat.  
 
RQ1– The Effects of Competence on Message Evaluation and Outcomes 
 
These data suggest that stakeholder judgments of pre-crisis data security competence is 
critical in how they evaluate the effectiveness of an information-rich crisis response as well 
as their behavioral intention towards the organizations affected. Competence was 
significantly positively correlated to crisis response effectiveness (r (278) = .27; p =.00) , 
behavioral intention to use the organization (r (296) = .41; p =.00), and interest in showing 
support for the organization in crisis (r (296) = .26; p =.00). Moreover, all three simple 
regressions were significant as well indicating that pre-crisis data security competence 
significantly influences stakeholder perceptions of the crisis response statement effectiveness 
( = .27; t (276) = 4.71; p = .00; R2adj. = .07), their intention to use the organization after the 
crisis ( = .41; t (294) = 7.74; p = .00; R2adj. = .17), and support they would be willing to 
show for the organization in crisis ( = .26; t (294) = 4.59; p = .00; R2adj. = .06).  
 
Evaluating the Relationship Between the Stakeholder and the Issue After Data Breaches 
 
Research question 2 explores the influence of different, relevant, stakeholder attitudes on 
their evaluation of crisis response, behavioral intention towards organizations, and 
reputational threat. Data were analyzed using correlation and regression (where appropriate) 
to evaluate the influence of uncertainty avoidance, efficacy, data behaviors, and issue 
experience on the dependent variables. These data suggested that stakeholder attitudes about 
the issue has no influence on crisis response message effectiveness; therefore, RQ2A are not 
further reported.  
 
For RQ2B exploring the relationship between stakeholder attitudes and behavioral intention, 
only personal data security behaviors (regular software updates) significantly predicted 
intention to continue using the organization with a significant correlation (r (328) = .12; p 
=.03) and significant simple regression ( = .12; t (326) = 2.24; p = .03; R2adj. = .01). These 
data suggest that the relationship between the stakeholder and the issue itself is not a strong 
predictor for organizational outcomes after a data breach. However, stakeholder attitudes had 
no influence on support for the organization, so no further discussion is warranted.  
 
For RQ2C exploring the relationship between stakeholder attitudes and reputational threat, 
there is a significant positive correlation between stakeholders’ efficacy to protect themselves 
against data breaches and the reputational threat created by a data breach (r (328) = .11; p 
=.05) and also a significant simple regression ( = .11; t (326) = 2.01; p = .05; R2adj. = .01). 
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Evaluating the Relationship Between the Stakeholder and the Organization After Data 
Breaches 
 
Research questions 3 and 4 explore the relative influence of the organization’s reputation and 
trust stakeholders place in the organization on their evaluation of crisis response messages, 
behavioral intention towards the organization after a crisis, and the reputational threat 
generated. Correlations and regressions (where appropriate) were used to analyze these data. 
These data demonstrate that reputation and trust significantly influence the dependent 
variables.  
 
RQ3 measures the influence of reputation on crisis response statement effectiveness, 
behavioral intention, and reputational threat. Organizations facing data breaches with a 
reputation are significantly more likely to be effective in communicating about the situation 
with significant correlation (r (278) = .36; p =.00) and also a significant simple regression ( 
= .36; t (276) = 6.43; p = .00; R2adj. = .13). A positive reputation also influences stakeholder 
intention to use the organization after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = .54; p 
=.00) and also a significant simple regression ( = .54; t (294) = 11.02; p = .00; R2adj. = .29). 
Similarly a positive reputation also encourages stakeholders to demonstrate more support for 
the organization after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = .36; p =.00) and also a 
significant simple regression ( = .36; t (294) = 6.55; p = .00; R2adj. = .12). Finally, a positive 
reputation encourages stakeholders to believe the organization will suffer less reputational 
threat after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = -.17; p =.00) and also a significant 
simple regression ( = .-.17; t (294) = -2.94; p = .00; R2adj. = .03). 
 
RQ4 measures the influence of stakeholder trust in the organization on crisis response 
statement effectiveness, behavioral intention, and reputational threat. When stakeholders trust 
the organization facing a data breach the organization’s response to the situation is 
significantly more likely to be effective (r (278) = .28; p =.00) and also a significant simple 
regression ( = .27; t (276) = 4.78; p = .00; R2adj. = .08). Stakeholder trust also influences 
their intention to use the organization after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = 
.51; p =.00) and also a significant simple regression ( = .51; t (294) = 10.27; p = .00; R2adj. = 
.26). Similarly stakeholder trust also encourages stakeholders to demonstrate more support 
for the organization after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = .32; p =.00) and also 
a significant simple regression ( = .32; t (294) = 5.77; p = .00; R2adj. = .10). Finally, 
stakeholder trust leads to their belief that the organization will suffer less reputational threat 
after the crisis with significant correlation (r (296) = -.21; p =.00) and also a significant 
simple regression ( = .-.21; t (294) = -3.64; p = .00; R2adj. = .04).  
 
Evaluating the Influence of Industry on Stakeholder Attitudes After a Data Breach 
 
Research question 5 explores the influence of the industry alone on stakeholder evaluations 
of crisis response messages, behavioral intention, and reputational damage after data breach 
crises in order to evaluate risks for data breaches in public versus private industries. ANOVA 
was used to analyze the influence of industry.  
 
RQ5A asked whether industry would influence stakeholder attitudes about the effectiveness 
of an information rich crisis response statement. The findings suggest that industry has a 
significant influence on crisis response statement effectiveness (F (2, 275) = 3.19; p = .04) 
with post hocs (see Table IV) revealing that doctor’s offices experiencing data breaches 
would be significantly more effective (M = 3.86) compared to the control group (M = 3.63). 
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These data also found for RQ5B that behavioral intention was significantly influenced by 
industry. Intention to use the organization after the data breach was significantly different (F 
(2, 325) = 4.90; p = .01) depending on industry with stakeholders significantly less likely to 
use banks (M = 2.73) compared to their doctor’s offices (M = 2.99) if they experienced a data 
breach (see Table III). Additionally, stakeholders felt significantly different supporting 
organizations in different industries experiencing data security breaches (F (2, 325) = 10.87; 
p = .00) with post hocs indicating (see Table IV) that they were significantly less likely to 
support banks (M = 3.20) compared to both their doctor’s offices (M = 3.52) and the control 
group (M = 3.66) in data security crises. There were, however, no significant differences for 
RQ5C identifying differences in the levels of perceived reputational threat across the 
industries.  
 
Table IV ANOVA for Industry Impact on Outcome Variables 
 
Dependent Variable df F p Post Hoc I Post Hoc J I-J Sig.  
Crisis Response Statement 
Effectiveness 
2, 275 3.19 .04 GP C .23 .04 
Behavioral Intention -Use 
the Organization 
2, 325 4.90 .01 Bank GP -.26 .01 
Behavioral Intention -  2, 325 10.87 .00 Bank GP -.32 .00 
Statement Effectiveness    Bank Control -.46 .00 
Notes: The alpha for all tests was set at .05. Only significant differences in Post hocs reported 
B = Bank, GP = Clinic, C = Control Group,  
 
Evaluating the Overall Factors Affecting Organizations Facing Data Security Breaches 
 
These individual findings provide insight into the factors influencing stakeholder evaluations 
of organizations facing data security breaches. However, when these factors are considered in 
research question 6, the clear finding is that building crisis capacity before a crisis provides 
organizations facing data security breaches the best opportunity to be persuasive and maintain 
a positive relationship with their stakeholders. Data were analyzed together in a hierarchical 
regression and include demographic control variables (where significantly correlated) of 
gender, age, income, and education.  
 
RQ6A – Factors Influencing Crisis Response Effectiveness  
 
Based on significant correlations previously discussed, the issue to organization and 
stakeholder to organization relationships were evaluated in a two-model hierarchical 
regression to evaluate the factors influencing the effectiveness of information rich crisis 
response messages to data security breaches. Both model 1 (F (2, 274) = 11.65; p = .00) and 
model 2 (F (5, 272) = 12.13; p = .00) were significant with a total adjusted r-square of .17 
(see Figure 3). Notably, a preventative crisis message is significantly less likely to be 
effective, accounting for about 11% of the variance alone suggesting organizations should not 
attempt to communicate about data breaches before they happen. Therefore, in model 2 only 
a positive pre-crisis reputation significantly predicted the success of the crisis response 
strategy.  
  





Figure 3. RQ6A Findings 
 
RQ6B – Factors Influencing Stakeholders’ Intention to Use the Organization Post-Crisis 
Based on significant correlations previously discussed, the issue to organization, stakeholder 
to issue, and stakeholder to organization relationships were evaluated in a three-model 
hierarchical regression to evaluate the factors influencing stakeholders’ behavioral intention 
to organizations experiencing data security breaches. Model 1 (F (3, 292) = 24.81; p = .00), 
model 2 (F (4, 291) = 19.79; p = .00), and model 3 (F (6, 289) = 22.34; p = .00) were 
significant with a total adjusted r-square of .30 (see Figure 4). However, in model 3 only a 
positive pre-crisis reputation significantly predicted stakeholders’ intention to use the 
organization facing the data security breach after the crisis. 
 
 
 Figure 4. RQ6B Findings 
Crisis Response Effectiveness
R2adj. = .17
Issue to Organization (IO)
R2adj. = .11
Material Blame + Industry
GP, latest technology 
 = .06
Control  = -.18**
Competence
 = .09











Issue to Organization (IO)
R2adj. = .20
Material Blame + 
Industry
Bank, knew didn't fix 
 = -.09
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RQ6C – Factors Influencing Stakeholders’ Perception of Reputational Threat Post-Crisis 
 
Based on significant correlations previously discussed, issue to organization, stakeholder to 
issue, and stakeholder to organization relationships were evaluated in a three-model 
hierarchical regression to evaluate the factors influencing stakeholders’ perception of 
reputational threat to organizations facing a data security breach. Gender was also 
significantly correlated (r (273) = .13; p = .04) and was included as a control variable, though 
it had no effect in the final model. Model 1 (F (3, 269) = 8.78; p = .00), model 2 (F (4, 268) = 
8.45; p = .00), and model 3 (F (6, 266) = 5.83; p = .00) were significant with a total adjusted 
r-square of .10 (see Figure 5). In the final model, both issue to organization and stakeholder 
to issue evaluations were significant. The majority of the variance (R2adj. = .07) was 
accounted for by the negative relationship between the organization’s competence on data 
security issues and reputational threat; however, stakeholder pre-existing efficacy also 
significantly influenced reputational threat with a positive relationship between efficacy and 
reputational threat.  
 
 
Figure 5. RQ6C Findings 
 
RQ6D – The Influence of Crisis Response Messages on Data Breach Outcomes 
 
In order to isolate the influence of post-crisis messages on stakeholders’ intention to use the 
organization in crisis after the breach and their perceptions of the reputational threat posed by 
the crisis, a two-model hierarchical regression was used for each of the dependent variables. 
In evaluating the influence of post-crisis messages on stakeholders’ intention to use the 
organization after a crisis both model 1 (F (6, 271) = 22.17; p = .00, R2adj. = .31) and model 2 
(F (7, 270) = 19.24; p = .00, R2adj. = .31) were significant. However, in the second model the 
crisis response message ( = .07) was not significant and did not significantly change the r-
square adjusted indicating that the previous model emphasizing the importance of pre-crisis 
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In evaluating the influence of post-crisis messages on stakeholders’ perception of the data 
security breach’s threat to the organization’s reputation, crisis response messages did 
significantly influence their appraisal. Both model 1 (F (5, 272) = 5.81; p = .00, R2adj. = .08) 
and model 2 (F (6, 271) = 5.75; p = .00, R2adj. = .09) were significant. In the second model the 
crisis response message was significant ( = .14, p = .03); however, the more effectively the 
organization communicated an information rich message about the crisis, the greater 
stakeholders evaluated the risk of the crisis to the organization’s reputation.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
One of the principle weaknesses in previous research was that while we have several analyses 
of how organizations respond in data breaches, we know little about how the situation may 
affect stakeholders’ behavioral intention and evaluations of the message’s effectiveness 
(Jahng & Hong, 2017; Janakiraman, Lim, & Rishika, 2018). Broadly the field of 
communication assumes that getting the right message to the right audience at the right time 
will create more positive outcomes for organizations. For the last several decades much of the 
field of crisis communication has assumed that in the context of a crisis the response strategy 
itself would materially help the organization. In fact, many of the studies of crisis 
communication from 1953 to 2014 emphasized identifying what crisis response strategies 
that organizations use to engage stakeholders after a crisis has emerged (Diers-Lawson, 2020; 
2017a). Though there are limited crisis communication studies of data breaches, these studies 
have often followed this approach in describing organizational responses to the data breaches 
(e.g., Kim, et al., 2017; Kim & Lee, 2018; Wang & Park, 2017).  
 
Because of this assumption, predictive theory has been difficult to develop, as evidenced by 
the research gaps we discussed both in relation to data security breaches and more broadly 
earlier in the paper (see e.g., Bakker, et al., 2018). Though these data are specific to both the 
UK and data security breaches in two industries, these findings should make the field 
question the primacy of crisis response strategies compared to building more resilient 
organizations (see, e.g., Doerfel, et al., 2020) or building crisis capacity. These data suggest 
that reactive crisis response may have limited predictive value once we consider the 
relationships between organization, the issue, and stakeholders. To validate this finding, 
future research should explore more representative samples, additional national contexts, 
industries, and types of crises; however, we believe this helps to better explain some of the 
limitations in research and practice of excellence in crisis response not translating 
immediately into reputational gains (see, e.g., Diers-Lawson & Pang, 2016; Diers, 2012).  
 
We recognize this is a bold conclusion; however, we believe the data clearly leads us to this 
conclusion. This project controlled the type of crisis situation, focused on a culturally 
relevant response, and used not only the most common crisis response strategy within that 
cultural context, but also one that previous research has identified ought to be used (across 
cultural contexts), and found that the response was viewed favorably. Despite all of that, 
there was no significant impact for a culturally relevant and favorable crisis response 
message on stakeholder behavioral intention once other factors – particularly reputation and 
issue competence – were considered. Of course, these findings are limited by a very specific 
type of a situation (i.e., data breaches), in a specific cultural context (i.e., the UK), in limited 
industries (i.e., banking and healthcare), and was based on data that was not entirely 
representative of the whole population, but we argue these findings are strong enough to 
warrant broadening the scope of the study to other contexts. These findings are also limited in 
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their application to short-term behavioral intention and do not reflect long-term impact of 
communicating effectively and ethically after a crisis.  
 
The long-term impacts of stakeholder engagement are also reflected in these findings. While 
these data suggest that reactive crisis response has little impact on immediate behavioral 
intention, these data also suggest that evaluations of the right time for stakeholder 
engagement are in the periods where organizations are not in crisis. However, these findings 
also offer a strong data security caveat – heightening stakeholders’ perceptions of risk for 
data breaches are likely to be counterproductive. More specifically, in our control group, 
there was no data breach; however, we reminded them that organizations hold private 
information and any organization may be susceptible to an illegal data breach (see Appendix 
B). A message like this is common across many types of institutions with secure log-ins and 
is designed to be a neutral message. However, these messages may damage both behavioral 
intent and generate reputation threat because they change the risk level without providing a 
solution to the problem (see Witte, 1996). Future research should explore this efficacy 
dynamic with data security breaches further. Instead, these data support previous research 
suggesting that a strong pre-crisis reputation is a vital part of building an organization’s crisis 
capacity to minimize negative behavioral intention after a crisis (Jahng & Hong, 2017; Tao & 
Song, 2020).  
 
The findings also suggest that stakeholder’s judgments of an organization’s competence to 
deal with a specific type of crisis – in our case the data breach – is likely tied to their attitudes 
about the organization that exist before the crisis emerges as well. In their conceptual piece 
Coombs and Holladay (2015) posited that social responsibility might well represent a risk to 
organizations once a crisis breaks. However, these findings along with others (Bae, Choi, & 
Lim, 2020; Kim & Lee, 2015; Tao & Song, 2020; Zhou & Ki, 2018) all suggest that 
organizations can build crisis capacity through long-term relationship development, 
demonstration of good will, trustworthiness – in short, the work that public relations in 
ethical organizations should be doing on a regular basis – represents a meaningful buffer 
against crises no matter the situational factors. Importantly, these findings also support and 
provide good theoretically grounded explanations for applied research identifying that 
organizations that are prepared and respond well can literally save themselves millions when 
facing data breaches (2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report, 2019; Gwebu et al., 2018).   
 
In applying Diers (2012) stakeholder relationship model, this study examined the two paths 
most crisis research takes – the first focusing on the organization and organizational 
responses to crisis and the second focusing on the organization’s capacity to respond. These 
data suggest that reactive crisis response has limited impact on stakeholder behavioral 
intentions once the factors that influence crisis capacity building are considered. However, 
without a strong relationship between an organization and its stakeholders ahead of a crisis, 
even the best responses are unlikely to help the organization in the short-term. These data 
also demonstrate that, at least within a British context, information-rich messages that 
highlight the organization’s competence, caring, cooperation, and the organization’s identity 
are well-received messages that reinforce the stakeholder’s perception when they have a 
positive view of the organization to begin with.  
 
For practitioners, these findings provide a compelling argument for the investment in long-
term relationship development and management with an organization’s existing stakeholders, 
independent of marketing efforts, as crisis capacity building activities. If the exponential 
growth in the last few years in data breaches tells us anything, it is that crises are inevitable 
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and if organizations are to retain their existing stakeholders let alone develop new ones, they 
must demonstrate their goodwill, trustworthiness, and competence before the crisis occurs. 
Afterwards, it may be too late to minimize the loss of business and patronage.  
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Appendix A: Message Response Provided for the Data Security Crisis  
 
When asked about the situation that you read about, what if your organisation said:  
 
We value our members and understand the importance of protecting personal 
information. We have taken measure to investigate and address a data security 
incident where some of our members private and secure information was accessed. 
The investigation determined that there was unauthorised access to the database 
containing all private information about our members. We have reported this incident 
to law enforcement and continue to support and cooperate in their investigation. We 
have also begun notifying regulatory authorities. We deeply regret this incident 
happened. From the start, we moved quickly to contain the incident and conduct a 
thorough investigation with the assistance of leading security experts. We are working 
hard to ensure our members have answers to questions about their personal 
information with a dedicated website and call centre. We are supporting the efforts of 
law enforcement and working with leading security experts to improve. We are also 
devoting resources necessary to phase outdated systems and accelerate ongoing 
security enhancements to our network. 
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Appendix B: Experimental Design Conditions 
 
Here is a brief summary of the situation you could face… 
• (Bank, Material Blame) Your bank has suffered a major data breach and your 
financial details have been compromised. Your bank was made aware six months 
prior of the possibility for an attack because their IT system’s security was flawed and 
could be susceptible to external threats. Your bank did not update or fix the errors 
which resulted in the breach of data. 
• (GP, Material Blame) Your GP surgery has suffered a major data breach and your 
medical records have been compromised. Your GP surgery was made aware six 
months prior of the possibility for an attack because their IT system’s security was 
flawed and could be susceptible to external threats. Your GP surgery did not update or 
fix the errors which resulted in the breach of data. 
• (Bank, No Material Blame) Your bank has suffered a major data breach and your 
financial details have been compromised. Your bank had the latest IT system security 
in place and no prior knowledge of any flaws in their security system. Your bank was 
unaware of the breach until the data had already been illegally accessed. 
• (GP, No Material Blame) Your GP surgery has suffered a major data breach and 
your medical records have been compromised. Your GP surgery had the latest IT 
system security in place and no prior knowledge of any flaws in their security system. 
Your GP surgery was unaware of the breach until the data had already been illegally 
accessed. 
• (Control, Inherent Data Risk) Institutions like your bank or your GP’s surgery both 
hold private and security information about you and are expected to protect your data. 
IT systems to protect your data are routinely updated, but there are always potential 
new threats. When data is illegally accessed these types of institutions sometimes 
have no knowledge of threats and some have knowledge of potential threats. 
 
